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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
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SHAUN PATRICK KELLY,
Defendant-Appellant.
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NOS. 45563 & 45564
Kootenai County Case Nos.
CR-2016-12518 & CR-2017-7644

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Kelly failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
aggregate unified sentence of life, with 35 years fixed, upon his guilty pleas to delivery of a
controlled substance—with an infliction of great bodily injury enhancement, unlawful possession
of a firearm, and felony eluding a peace officer?

Kelly Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
In August 2015, Kelly forced two individuals who had come to his home to “‘get high’”
to “strip down naked,” then took their keys and phones and, at gunpoint, ordered one of them,
Evan Larkin, to ingest a “1.8 gram rock” of methamphetamine.
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(PSI, p.3.)

After Evan

complied, Kelly ordered the other victim, Joshua Brown, “to do the same. Mr. Brown refused
but eventually injected himself with a portion of the meth[amphetamine].” (PSI, p.3.) Kelly
ultimately allowed the victims to get dressed but, shortly thereafter, Evan began “acting strange”;
he stripped down to his boxers, had saliva and foam coming from his mouth, and appeared to be
seizing. (PSI, p.3.) Joshua Brown tried to get Kelly to call for an ambulance, “but this did not
happen.” (PSI, p.3.) Instead, “Kelly told Mr. Brown to ‘drop Evan off somewhere outside of
Post Falls in a random location.’” (PSI, p.3.) Joshua drove Evan to the hospital and “left him in
his truck at the entrance to the ER.” (PSI, p.3.) Evan “was unconscious when he was found in
the truck and never regained consciousness.” (PSI, p.3.) He died three days later. (PSI, pp.3-4.)
The state charged Kelly, in case 45563, with second degree murder, unlawful possession
of a firearm, and aggravated assault, as well as with deadly weapon and persistent violator
sentencing enhancements. (R., Vol. I, pp.120-22. 1) After he pled not guilty, Kelly posted bond
and was released from custody. (R., Vol. I, pp.139, 180.)
Seven months later, while the charges in case 45563 were still pending, Kelly eluded
police officers in Coeur d’Alene in a stolen U-Haul truck. (PSI, p.4.) Law enforcement officers
located Kelly a short time later and, after a foot pursuit, found him hiding inside a camper trailer.
(PSI, p.4.) Kelly refused to come out of the camper and was ultimately “apprehended by [a]
K9.” (PSI, p.4.)

The Clerk’s Record is divided into three PDF documents. Volume I corresponds to “KELLY
#45563 45564 #1 CR.pdf,” Volume II corresponds to “CR 16-12518 & CR 17-7644 KELLY
#45563 45564 #2.pdf,” and Volume III corresponds to “KELLY #45563 45564 #3 CR.pdf.”
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The state charged Kelly, in case 45564, with grand theft by possession of stolen property
and felony eluding a peace officer, as well as with a persistent violator sentencing enhancement.
(R., Vol. III, pp.101-03.)
Pursuant to a global plea agreement, Kelly pled guilty to an amended charge of delivery
of a controlled substance—with an infliction of great bodily injury enhancement, and to unlawful
possession of a firearm in case 45563, and he pled guilty to felony eluding a peace officer in case
45564. (R., Vol. II, pp.35-37, 40-42.) The remaining charges and enhancements, along with
three other pending cases, were dismissed. (R., Vol. II, pp.37-39.) The district court imposed a
unified sentence of life, with 25 years fixed, for delivery of a controlled substance—with the
infliction of great bodily injury enhancement, a consecutive five-year fixed sentence for unlawful
possession of a firearm, and a consecutive five-year fixed sentence for felony eluding a peace
officer. (R., Vol. III, pp.9-11, 136-38.) Kelly filed notices of appeal timely from the judgments
of conviction. (R., Vol. III, pp.12-15, 141-44.)
Kelly asserts his aggregate sentence of life, with 35 years fixed, is excessive in light of
his “difficult childhood,” desire to rehabilitate, purported remorse, and acceptance of
responsibility. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-9.) The record supports the sentences imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant

3

must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The penalty for delivery of a controlled substance is up to life in prison and the infliction
of great bodily injury enhancement can add an additional 20 years to a sentence. I.C. §§ 372732(a)(1)(A), 19-2520B. Unlawful possession of a firearm and felony eluding a peace officer
each carry a maximum sentence of five years. I.C. §§ 18-3316(1), -112, 49-1404(2). The district
court imposed a unified sentence of life, with 25 years fixed, for delivery of a controlled
substance—with an infliction of great bodily injury enhancement, and consecutive sentences of
five years fixed for unlawful possession of a firearm and felony eluding a peace officer, all of
which fall within the statutory guidelines. (R., Vol. III, pp.9-11, 136-38.)
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its
decision and addressed the seriousness of the offenses, Kelly’s abysmal history of criminal
conduct, the risk he presents to society, and his failure to be deterred despite numerous prior
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legal sanctions. (10/12/17 Tr., p.35, L.22 – p.44, L.5.) The court recognized that Kelly disputed
the surviving victim’s assertions that Kelly held the victims at gunpoint and forced them to
ingest and/or inject methamphetamine, but the court specifically found those assertions “to be
credible” and found Kelly’s statements to the contrary were “not … particularly credible.”
(10/12/17 Tr., p.39, L.25 – p.41, L.14.) The court also found, consistent with the record, that
Kelly “appears to be a career criminal,” having spent “[o]ver a period of 25 years, [his] entire
adult life … engaged in criminal conduct that is dangerous and harmful to other members of the
public.” (10/12/17 Tr., p.42, L.24 – p.43, L.4; see also PSI, pp.6-12 (Kelly’s “past criminal
history appears to consist of nine prior adult misdemeanor convictions and nine prior adult
felony convictions,” he has served prison time and completed at least one “rider,” and “was on
supervised probation throughout his adult life,” during which time “he did not do well … and
received serval violations.”).) Considering the seriousness of the crimes, Kelly’s character, and
the factors set forth in I.C. § 19-2521, the court determined that a lengthy prison sentence was
warranted, in part because the court found “there is absolutely an undo [sic] risk” that “Kelly
would commit another crime” if released to community supervision. (10/12/17 Tr., p.43, Ls.525.) Finally, addressing Kelly’s expression of remorse, the court admonished Kelly:
I do not believe you are remorseful. I do not see or hear that you take
responsibility for your conduct, your words notwithstanding. You are volatile and
dangerous, and society must be protected from you during most of the rest of your
natural life.
(10/12/17 Tr., p.44, Ls.1-5.)
On appeal, Kelly contends that the district court “did not adequately consider” a number
of factors he claims are mitigating, including what he characterizes as his “difficult childhood.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.) That the court did not specifically articulate its consideration of Kelly’s
childhood as a mitigating factor is hardly surprising, however, as Kelly reported to the

5

presentence investigator that he “had a good life when [he] was a kid” and his “parents loved
[him] very much.” (PSI, p.12 (capitalization altered, internal quotations marks omitted).) Kelly
did report that he was sexually abused by an older brother, but he had no recollection of the
abuse and represented that “other thans [sic] that [he] had a very good upbringing.” (PSI, pp.1213 (capitalization altered, internal quotation marks omitted).)
Kelly next claims that the district court “also did not adequately consider [his] remorse
and acceptance of responsibility.” (Appellant’s brief, p.7.) This claim is meritless because, as
explained above, the district court did expressly consider Kelly’s claims of remorse and
acceptance of responsibility but found those claims unbelievable. (See 10/12/17 Tr., p.44, Ls.15.) While Kelly may understandably wish that the court had accepted his expressions of remorse
and acceptance of responsibility as sincere, he has fallen far short of demonstrating an abuse of
discretion.
Kelly’s claim that the district court “did not adequately consider [his] desire to
rehabilitate” (Appellant’s brief, p.8) likewise fails to show an abuse of discretion. As noted
above, the district court considered Kelly’s long history of criminal offending and found, based
on Kelly’s prior failures to be deterred or rehabilitated despite prior legal sanctions, that Kelly “is
in need of correctional treatment that can most effectively be provided by his commitment to an
institution.” (10/12/17 Tr., p.42, L.24 – p.43, L.14.) That the court was unwilling to elevate
Kelly’s “desire” for rehabilitation above the need to protect society does not render Kelly’s
sentence excessive. This is especially true since the record shows that Kelly has previously
participated in substance abuse treatment through St. Vincent de Paul and Teen Challenge, and
while he reported that he was substance free for a time after completing those programs, Kelly
eventually went back to abusing methamphetamine. (PSI, p.17.)
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For all the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons more fully set forth by the district court
in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript (10/12/17 Tr., p.35, L.22 – p.44, L.5
(Appendix A)), Kelly has failed to show any abuse of discretion.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Kelly’s convictions and sentences.

DATED this 15th day of May, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 15th day of May, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
BEN P. MCGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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of medical records. There are a number of polioe
reports that are attached, and irs the first page
after that.
THE COURT: So is it MR. WALSH: The first page of the medical
records.
THE COURT: Page 190 and 275 of the PSI?
MR. WALSH: Mine is not numbered that way,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WALSH: The medical number Is
MED000601.
THE COURT: Got it.
MR. WALSH: I just want to read this Into
the record.
MISS GARDNER: I'm sorry. I've got to get
on the same page here. Which page did the court say?
THE COURT: Page 190 of 275 of the PSI.
MISS GARDNER: Okay. Just if I oould just
take a second here...
THE COURT: Sure.
MISS GARONER: This is divided up into
three parts.
THE COURT: Sure.
MISS GARDNER: Thank you.
33
MR. WALSH: Your Honor, I'm looking at
"History of Present Illness,• and it says, "The patient
was a 22-year-old male brought to Kootenai Health by a
friend, who quickly left when patient was brought to
the hospital. No Information was available as to what
had happened. It was not known as to whether he was on
any medications or had any allergies to medications."
That's all I wanted to say, just to clear
up what Mr. Brown did when he left Evan at the
hospital. This is a medical record. There's oertainly
no - actually, there's a great deal of Incentive by
this neutral third-party, the medical record creator,
to provide an accurate record.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. Kelly, would you like to address the
court?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I would.
THE COURT: Mr. Kelly, if you want to read
a statement, you're certainly weloome to do that. Just
remember to read slowly and clearly.
THE DEFENDANT: Can I read it to them?
THE COURT: No. You can address the oourt.
THE DEFENDANT: There are no words to
describe how sorry I am for the loss, but there are a
few things I would like to say.
34
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Evan Lar1<ln was a dear friend of mine. I
never pointed a gun at him, but I did supply him with
the drugs he requested, which ultimately became the
cause of his death.
The tragedy that occurred Is an unbearable
memory for me. I wish that I oould take away the pain
and sorrow felt by his family and friends and loved
ones. My sincere apology is hardly enough. However,
it is all that I can offer. I am extremely sorry.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Kelly. You may
both be seated.
I think that it would be appropriate we've been at it nearly an hour. I think it would be
appropriate to take a short break before I announce the
sentence, so let's take about a ten-minute break, come
back at 2:30, and 111 pronounce sentence.
(Recess.)
THE COURT: All right. We're back on the
record in State versus Shaun Kelly in case number
CR-16-12518 and CR-17-7644. I am ready to pronounoe
the sentence.
Mr. Kelly, I do find that you are guilty of
the crimes to which you pied guilty and admitted guilt
in case number CR-16-12518, for Count I, detivery of a
oontrolled substance to Evan Larkin, with reckless
35
disregard for his safety, causing great bodily injury,
which resulted in his death. DeMvery of a oontrolled
substance Is punishable by a term of imprisonment of up
to life. The sentence enhancement for great bodily
Injury adds 20 years.
Also, in case number CR-16-12518, you pied
guilty and I find you are guilty of the crime of
unlawful possession of a firearm. This felon in
possession charge carries up to a five-year prison
sentence.
In case number CR-17-7644, you pied guilty
and I find that you are guilty of felony eluding law
enforcement. This felony charge, felony eluding
charge, also carries up to a fivEryear prison sentence.
District judges in Idaho have a great deal
of discretion in sentencing, and the court recognizes
its discretion. Of course, the oourt cannot exceed the
maximum terms of Imprisonment established by statute.
The court has considered criteria for probation or
imposing imprisonment set forth in Idaho Code Section
19-2521, as discussed by the Court of Appeals in State
versus Toohill, which is a 1982 case found at
103 Idaho 565.
Generally speaking, the primary and
overarching objective of sentencing is protection of
36
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society. Secondary to protection of society, but,
nevertheless, important, are the deterrenoe of the
individual and of the pubUc generally; rehabilitation;
and retribution or punishment.
The Court of Appeals in Toohill discussed
reasonableness in connection with sentencing and held
that a term of imprisonment is reasonable to the extent
it appears neoessary at the time of sentencing to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society
and to achieve any or all of the related goats of
deterrenoe, rehabilitation, and retribution.
The factors set forth in Idaho Code Section
19-2521(1) requires the court, if it is of the opinion
that imprisonment is appropriate for protection of the
public, it requires the court to consider the following
factors, any or all of the following factors:
That there is undo risk that during a
period of suspended sentence or probation the defendant
would commit another crime;
Or, the defendant is in need of
correctional treatment that can be provided most
effectively by his commitment to an institution;
Or, a lesser sentenoe will depreciate the
seriousness of the defendant's crime;
Or, Imprisonment v,;11 provide appropriate
37
punishment and deterrence to the defendant;
Or, imprisonment will provide an
appropriate deterrent for other persons in the
community;
Or, the defendant is a multiple offender or
professional criminal.
Under (2) of that particular code section,
the following grounds, while not controlling, shall be
accorded weight in favor of avoiding a sentence of
imprisonment. They are these:
That the defendant's criminal conduct
neither caused nor threatened harm;
The defendant did not contemplate that his
criminal conduct would cause or threaten harm;
The defendant acted under a strong
provocation;
There were substantial grounds tending to
excuse or justify the defendant's criminal conduct,
though failing to establish a defense;
The victim of the defendant's criminal
conduct induced or facilitated the commission of the
crime;
The defendant has or will compensate the
victim of his criminal conduct;
The defendant has no history of prior
38
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delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law
abiding life for a substantial period of time;
The defendant's criminal conduct was a
result of circumstanoes unlikely to occur;
And the character and attitudes of the
defendant indicate that the commission of another crime
is unlikely.
In preparing for sentencing today, I have
read the case files, the sentencing materials provided
by the State, the sentencing materials provided by the
defense, the presentence investigation report, the
letter from Clay and Deanna Larkin, a statement of Lori
Lart<in as expressed to the PSI investigator,
Mr. Larkin's and Miss Larkin's statements today in
court, Mr. Kelly's statements in the PSI and in court
today, letters from Mr. Kelly's parents and cousin,
materials concerning the Pacific Northwest Adult and
Teen Challenge program, and a letter from a past
employer of Mr. Kelly.
I have reviewed medical records, the
autopsy report, police reports. I've considered the
sentencing recommendations made by the parties along
with other statements and testimony offered in
connection with today's proceedings.
The facts of these cases are shocking and
39
highly disturbing, and I will say at the outset, sinoe
it was a subject of much discussion today, I do find
Mr. Brown's story to be credible. I find it to be
credible because it makes sense, because it's the same
story, essentially, that he told over and again.
Based on what Mr. Bro'Ml said, Evan Larkin
and his friend or acquaintance, Josh Brown, reportedly
went to Mr. Kelly's residence on August 20th, 2015 to
get high. When they arrived, Mr. Kelly was very
agitated. He demanded that they strip down so he could
check for wires and then demanded that they ingest
toxic, deadly amounts of methamphetamine.
Mr. Lart<ln resisted. Mr. Kelly reportedly
went into another room and returned with an assault
rifle and threatened Mr. Larkin with it.
I know you dispute that, Mr. Kelly. At
your guilty plea hearing you said you had the gun, you
showed it to them, but you did not threaten anyone with
it. I do not find that statement to be particularly
credible.
Mr. Larkin then consumed nearly a two-gram
chunk of methamphetamlne. Mr. Bro'Ml refused to ingest
that amount, but conceded to slamming or IV injecting
meth. Mr. Lart<in started overheating, then seizing and
foaming at the mouth. According to Mr. Brown, Mr.
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Kelly refused Mr. Brown's pleas to allow emergency
medical services to be called, telling Mr. Brown to
take Mr. Lar1<in and dump him in a field somewhere.
Mr. Brown was able to get M'. Larkin's
truck started and took him to KMC and left him in the
truck, which was still running by the reports that I
read. Mr. Brown eventually left the premises, or left
the premises right away. Unfortunately, Mr. Larkin was
pronounced deceased three days later of brain death and
multi-system failure.
Eventually, the police were able to
identify Mr. Brown, who it appears has, as I said,
pretty consistently provided the same story as to what
happened.
And, Mr. Kelly, at your guilty plea hearing
you conceded that you gave Mr. Larkin methamphetamine
with reckless disregard for his safety. You posted
bond, and you were in the community until last May. At
that time you used someone else's financial transaction
card to rent a U-Haul pickup in Spokane. The entity
reported it stolen. You were identified on a video
recording as the person who stole the vehicle. You and
your passenger crossed into Idaho.
At about Appleway and Ramsey Road, law
enforcement signaled you to pull over. Mr. Kelly
41
slowed down, then sped through a couple of lights, very
nearly wrecking other cars. He sped north on Ramsey
Road in Coeur d'Alene recklessly, abandoning the
vehicle at Holy Family Catholic School at the end of
Kathleen. Mr. Kelly and the female were seen near
Atlas and Seltice, and Mr. Kelly ran into a
neighborhood where he hid in a camper and refused to
exit the camper. A canine went in after him and bit
him and pulled him out.
At that time Mr. Kelly was wearing a shirt
that belonged to the owner of the trailer, and there
was an Apple watch that also belonged to the owner of
the camper in the pocket of the shirt.
As you know, there were several charges and
cases filed and pending against you. As part of the
plea agreement, the State agreed to amend the second
degree murder charge to delivery of a controlled
substance, vmich canies the same maximum penalty as
second degree murder, along with the great bodily
injury enhancement, adding up to 20 years. The felony
in possession of fireann charge remained, and the only
charge remaining from the 2017 incident and other
incidents was the felony eluding law enforcement.
I reviewed Mr. KeKy's criminal history as
set forth in the PSI. It reveals a person who appears
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to be a career criminal. over a period of 25 years,
your entire adult life, Mr. Kely has engaged in
criminal conduct that is dangerous and hannful to other
members of the public.
Section 19-2521 factors suggest that prison
Is appropriate In this case. Returning to those, I
think there Is absolutely an undo risk that if I were
to suspend a sentence that Mr. Kelly would commit
another crime. That is evidenced most recently by his
committing crimes while he was pending the 2016 charges
and had posted a sizable bond and that Mr. Kelly is in
need of correctional treatment that can most
effectively be provided by his commitment to an
institution.
One of the factors that absolutely jumped
out at this court is that a lesser sentence would
depreciate the seriousness of your crimes. In
addition, imprisonment would provide appropriate
punishment and deterrence, both to you and to the
general public.
It appears that you are a multiple
offender, perhaps a professional criminal, and when
going through the factors in (2) of Section 19-2521,
there are no particular factors in favor of probation
that speak to the court.

43
1
2
3

•
5

e
1
8

t
10

11

12

13
14
15

1e
11

18
19
20
21
22

23
24

2s

I do not believe you are remorseful. I do
not see or hear that you take responsibility for your
conduct, your words notwithstanding. You are volatile
and dangerous, and society must be protected from you
during most of the rest of your natural life.
In case number CR-2016-12518, on Count I,
delivery of methamphetamine with great bodily injury, I
sentence Mr. Kelly to Ute in prison, with 25 years
fixed.
On Count II, felon in possession of a
fireann, I sentence Mr. Keffy to five years in prison
fixed, consecutive to Count I.
In case number CR-17-7644, on a charge of
felony eluding police, I sentence Pk. Kelly to five
years in prison fixed, consecutive to the charges in
CR-16-12518.
The sentences are imposed.
So that there is no question, Mr. Kelly is
sentenced to a total of 35 years fixed with life
indetenninate. The sentences, as I indicated, are
imposed.
Mr. Kelly, you will have 42 days from the
date the written judgments are entered to file an
appeal. I would suggest that you speak with Mr. Walsh
about that.
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